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Pre-marital investments by spouses are largely viewed as public
goods within the marriage. So individuals may underinvest. But indi-
viduals also use their investments to compete for spouses with higher
investments. In a large marriage market, the higher equilibrium match
quality obtained by increasing pre-marital investment exactly internal-
izes the external benet of the investment so the competitive equilib-
rium is ecient. This model of competing investments in local public
goods is a special case of Rosen's hedonic market model. In small
marriage markets, the competition for spouses will raise incentives to
invest in pre-marital investments as well as making these investments
less predictable.
1 Introduction
In marriage, an individual derives utility from own pre-marital investment
and the pre-marital invesment of his or her spouse. Much of this investment
is human capital investment made by altruistic parents. Since pre-marital
1investment is a public good in marriage, parents may under invest in their
children.
The under investment conjecture is premature. It ignores the competition
for spouses in the marriage market. In this paper, we study pre-marital
investments when children use these investments to compete for spouses. We
are primarily interested in the implications of assortative matching equilibria
which occur when wealthy individuals are matched with wealthy partners.
Then altruistic parents take into account the additional utility their children
will enjoy from wealthier partners, and this will increase their incentive to
invest in their children on the margin.
Our rst model considers the case where the number of families is very
large. We study a competitive equilibrium in which all families on the same
side of the market believe that they face the same non-stochastic return to
their investment in their children. This return function adjusts until families
beliefs are fullled in equilibrium.
Perhaps the most remarkable property of investment in the competitive
equilibrium is the fact that the externalities associated with families' invest-
ments in their children are completely internalized by this return function.
Any pair of families whose children match on the competitive equilibrium
path, will make investments that are bilaterally pareto optimal. Despite the
fact that neither family can directly compensate the other family for the
investment that it makes in its child, the marriage market and the assorta-
tive matching that occurs there forces each family to compensate the other
indirectly through the investment that it makes in its own child.
This eciency result is an application of Rosen's hedonic pricing (Rosen
1974) approach to large matching problems. The market return function
provides what is essentially a hedonic value for every investment level that
a family might consider making. Families on the other side of the market
need to provide these hedonic values in order to attract partners with specic
investment levels. In equilibrium, each family's indierence curve (in the
space of investments) will be tangent to this hedonic return function, and
consequently, families whose children match will have indierence curves that
are tangent to each other. The investments that families undertake will then
be bilaterally ecient in the sense that there will not be another pair of
investments that will make both of the matched families better o at the
same time. Since the joint payos that we employ are supermodular ((Becker
1973),(Smith 1996)), assortative matching along with bilateral eciency are
sucient to guarantee that the distribution of investments for the economy
2is ecient.
Matters are more complicated in small marriage markets. When the
number of families and children is small, assortative matching among children
will raise families incentive to invest and at the same time make families
investments less predictable. If there are signicant wealth disparities on
the other side of the market, parents may nd that they can increase the
wealth of their child's partner signicantly by raising their investment only
slightly. This makes parental payo functions discontinuous, which rules out
pure strategy equilibria in some situations. In the mixed strategy equilibria
that do prevail, parental investment is stochastic. Though rich families will
invest more in their children on average than poor families do, there will
be a positive probability that the poor families will invest more than rich
families so that their children move up the wealth distribution. This creates
endogenous intergenerational mobility.
Equilibria always exist for the families investment game when there is
assortative matching. Since the equilibria involve mixed investment strate-
gies, they can be complex. To get around this, we begin by looking at the
simplest non-trivial market structure imaginable, in which there are only two
families on each side of the market. For this case, we can give a complete
characterization of equilibrium. We show that all families will invest more on
average in their children than if there is no competition for spouses. While
richer families will invest more on average than poorer families, the proba-
bility that parents and children switch places in the wealth distribution is
non-zero. Furthermore, the investment levels that families do make will not
generally be ecient.
The mixed strategy equilibria for this special case illustrate some of the
properties of mixed strategy equilibrium for the more general case, but are
otherwise quite special. Mixed strategy equilibria with arbitrary numbers of
families are dicult to characterize, especially in the case where there are
dierent numbers of families on each side of the market.
Our paper innovates primarily by making the level of investment that
occurs on both sides of the market endogenous. Various authors have con-
sidered matching problems where investments occur prior to matching on
one side of the market (for example (Shi 1997)). However, the impact of
match quality on investment does not arise in these models. The paper that
is most closely related to our own is (Cole, Malaith and Postlewaite 1998)
who analyze a two sided matching investment problem. There are two impor-
tant dierences between our paper and theirs. First, they consider the case
3of transferable utility - partners can make agreements to transfer money or
share surplus in a way that depends on investments. This approach is more
appropriate to modelling rm worker matching problems where rms can
make wages depend on human capital investments by rms. Incentives to
invest are much stronger in such environments because the market provides
an explicitly monetary reward for investment. No such reward exists in our
paper. Furthermore, (Cole et al. 1998) use a cooperative matching process to
pair traders and determine how surplus is shared in each match. For small
marriage markets, our matching process is non-cooperative. (Siow and Zhu
1998) also study a two side matching investment problem with transferable
utility and two wealth classes on each side of the market. They also study
multigenerational equilibria. (Acemoglu 1997) studies a two side matching
investment model with workers and rms. He obtains underinvestment be-
cause due to potential random matching, workers and rms are unable to
fully capture the returns to their pre-employment investments.
While this paper focuses on the marriage market, our analysis applies to
other partnerships in which the share of surplus in the partnership is not
conditioned on the level of pre-partnership investment. Members of ama-
teur sports teams and co-authors in economics usually do not divide surplus
according to their levels of pre-partnership investments. In most of these
markets, agents invest in pre-partnership human capital and then compete
for partners. The results in this paper should be useful for thinking about
those markets as well.
2 Preliminaries
Families begin with an endowment of wealth y which can be used partly
as current consumption, and partly as an investment in children. Let w be
the amount invested in the child. If the child subsequently matches with a
partner whose wealth level is w0 then utility for the parents is given by
V (y   w) +
w + w0
z
; z > 0
and utility of the child is
w + w0
z
4If the family invests w and the child is not expected to match, then we assume
that the child has utility w=z. The actual value of the childrens' utility when
no match occurs is unimportant as long as both the child and family are at
least weakly better o when a match occurs than if it doesn't.1
Assumption The function V () is monotonically increasing, strictly con-
cave and satises
lim
x!0V (x) =  1
The bilateral Nash, or non-competitive investment levels for each family
are given by the solutions to
V






These are the investment levels that the families would make if they believed
(for whatever reason) that their children's match partner is independent of
parental investment. In the case where there are only two families, one
on each side of the market, the investment of the family on the other side
of the market would be xed and equilibrium investment would satisfy 1.
Investment would be inecient in this case because 1 does not take account
of the positive eect that the family's investment has on the family on the
other side of the market.
After the families have made their investments, the children compete for
partners in the marriage market. We will rst study the investment and
matching problem in a large marriage market. Then we will investigate
properties of small marriage markets.
3 Large Marriage Markets
This section considers a large marriage market with a continuum of families
on each side of the market. We refer to families with female children as
families `in F' and similarly, families with male children are families `in M'.
Let G and G0 be measure of the set of families in M and F respectively.
1It is possible that children might strictly prefer not to match if the best available part-
ner is too poor. This creates problems for our methodology, but these are not particularly
relevant for the issues we wish to discuss.
5Figure 1: Figure 1 - Matching Function
Interpret G(B) to be the measure of the set of families whose endowments
lie in the set B and similarly for G0. Let g (w) represent the wealth of the
wife that each family in M expects to match with from an investment of
w in their son. Similarly, g 1(w0) represents the wealth of the groom that
each family in F expects to match with from an investment of w0 in their
daughter.
g(w) is expected to be non-decreasing in w. Since it is costly for families
to supply w beyond the Nash level, families in M will be willing to supply
more w only if they can get a return for their investment. A non-decreasing
g(w) will imply assortative matching in equilibrium.
Denition 1 The return function g (w) is a rational expectations equilib-
rium if there is an interval [w;w] such that for every w 2 [w;w] there exist
income levels y (w) and y0 (w) such that
1. G(y (w)) = 0; G0 (y0 (w)) = F   M; G(y (w)) = M; G0 (y0 (w)) = F
and M   G(y (w)) = F   G0 (y0 (w)) for w 2 (w;w);
2. w 2 argmaxx
n









0 (w)   x) +
x + g 1 (x)
z

Figure 1 illustrates a rational expectations equilibrium. The investment
levels for families in M are given along the horizontal axis, while investments
for families in F are along the vertical axis. The dark curve illustrates the
equilibrium matching function. The lighter curves that are convex upward
are indierence curves for families in M, those that are convex downward are
indierence curves for families in F. A family in M who invests w should
expect their child to match with someone whose wealth is g (w). In equilib-
rium, if a family chooses investment w then their indierence curve should
be tangent to the curve g (w) at the point (w;g (w)). The reason is that
the family thinks that g (w) represents the market return function that they
face. Similarly, any family in F who chooses to invest g (w) should expect
6return w. In equilibrium this family must have an indierence curve tan-
gent to the market trade-o function g 1 () at the point (w;g (w)).This
implies that the indierence curves of the families of every pair of children
who match in equilibrium will be tangent to each other and investment levels
are bilaterally ecient. As the picture is drawn, the family from M is the
one with the lowest endowment, while the family from F is the family with
the lowest endowment who actually succeeds in matching.
To see this more formally, focus on the case where both G and G0 are
monotonic, and let (w) satisfy M  G(y) = F  G0 ((y)). By assortative
matching, a family in M with income y should end up matching with a family
from F whose income is (y) provided that each families investment is an
increasing function of its endowment. Suppose that the optimal investment
level in the rational expectations equilibrium for each family in M is some
function wm (y), while the corresponding function for families in F is wf (y).
A necessary condition for optimality is that a family whose income is y should
prefer to invest wm (y) to any investment level wm (y0). Since each family's
payo is given by
V (y   wm (y)) +
wm (y) + wf ((y))
z








V 0 (y   wm (y))   1
z
 (2)









V 0 (y   wf ((y)))   1
z
 (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) gives the tangency of the indierence curves for
family y in M and (y) in F.
This bilateral eciency is enough to ensure full pareto optimality of the
equilibrium allocation. To show this, it is sucient to demonstrate that
pareto improvements cannot be achieved by rematching the families' chil-
dren then adjusting the ex ante investment levels of families. Figure 1 can
be used to illustrate this. Children are initially matched assortatively. Sup-
pose that a pareto improvement can be obtained by rematching in such a
7way that family A in M is rematched with family B from F. To illustrate
the argument, suppose that family A is the family in Figure 1 who chooses
the point A while family B is the family from F who chooses the outcome
B. If matching family B with family A results in a pareto improvement,
then investment levels need to be adjusted so that both families end up on
higher indierence curves than they attain in the initial assortative matching
equilibrium. Since the allocations that A prefers to the allocation in the as-
sortative matching equilibrium lie everywhere above the market return line
g (w) while the allocations that B prefers lie everywhere below it, this will
not be possible.
4 Existence of a Rational Expectations Equi-
librium
In some simple problems existence of a rational expectations equilibrium is
immediate. For example, suppose that G = G0. Then set g (w) = w. Then
each family chooses the (ecient) level of investment w that equates the
marginal utility of consumption and 2. For a variety of reasons, this is not a
good example of the rational expectations solution concept. We return to it
momentarily.
A more illuminating example occurs when G and G0 dier. Suppose as
before that F > M but that all the families in F have the same endow-
ment. In gure 1, let the indierence curve touching the vertical axis be the
common indierence curve for all these families. Dene g (x) to be equal to
this indierence curve, and let the families in M choose the point on this
indierence curve that they most desire. Families in F can be spread over
the indierence curve in a manner that ensures the market clearing condition
holds. The market return function will have a closed form solution provided
that the indierence curve can be represented in closed form.
To see the solution for the more general case, suppose that G and G0 are
both strictly monotonic with dierentiable inverse functions whose deriva-
tives are bounded away from 0 and innity. Let u be strictly concave and
dierentiable with marginal utility bounded above. Dene for each y in the
support of G 
 (y) = fy0 2 suppG0 : F   G0 (y0) = M   G(y)g. Since G and
G0 are both monotonic and dierentiable, so is 
. Furthermore, the deriva-
tive of 
 is bounded away from 0 and 1. The rst order condition for the
8optimal investment for a family of income y is given by
 u
0 (y   w) +
1 + g0 (w)
z
= 0
Since u0 is monotonic, it has an inverse. This implies that the income of the








The family in F who invests g (w) has an income level such that g (w) satises
 u
0 (y





In equilibrium, this family matches with the family in M who invests w.
If g () is a rational expectations solution, the measure of families who are
wealthier than this family from M must be equal to the measure of families





















































Let (g0;w) denote the expression on the right hand side of this equation.
Since  is monotonically decreasing in g0 the inverse function  1 (;w) exists.
So the market return function must satisfy
g
0 (w) = 
 1 (g (w);w) (4)
To see the initial condition, let y be the poorest family from F who suc-
cessfully matches with some family from M in equilibrium (y satises F  
9G0 (y) = M). Let I be the highest indierence curve that the family with
endowment y can attain when they do not match. Let (w;g (w)) be the
point where this indierence curve is tangent to the indierence curve for a
family in M who endowment is y. The equilibrium market return function is
then any solution to (4) with initial condition (w;g (w)). To ensure existence
and uniqueness of the solution we need to impose additional restrictions on
the problem to ensure that  1 satises the usual Lipshitz condition in g.
We do not pursue these issues here.
5 A Hedonic Pricing Interpretation
The above model can be interpreted as a special case of Rosen's hedonic
market model. To see this most easily, consider families in M as suppliers.
Let y be the characteristic of a supplier. Let w be the level of output (pre-
marital investment) that a supplier produces. Note that w also provides
consumption value for the supplier and thus is not purely costly. g(w) is
the return that a son gets for supplying w. We may consider families in
F as demanders. If a demander pays w0, the daughter will match with a
supplier whose output is g 1(w0). Unlike Rosen, demanders value paying
w0. However this does not cause any analytic diculty because a demander,
that is matched, will pay a higher w0 than she is willing to pay if she is not
matched. So as in the case of Rosen's rms, the demander will prefer to pay
less w0 for her matched supplier if she could.
With this interpretation, results that apply to Rosen's hedonic market
model may apply here as well. For example, the diculties of estimating
hedonic pricing functions is well known (E.g. (Epple 1987) or (Kahn and
Lang 1988)). These diculties appear here as well (Botticini and Siow 1999).
6 Small Marriage Markets
In discussing small marriage markets, we have to rst discuss the non-
cooperative matching process among the children. The key property of this
process is that it involves assortative matching. One non-cooperative pro-
cedure that will ensure this is the Gale-Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962)
algorithm. Male children publicly advertize their wealth levels. After seeing
the wealth levels available, each female child chooses one and only one male
10as a potential partner and proposes a match to the male. The male can select
one and only one of the proposals he receives and can form a match with the
female who made the proposal.
To analyze this matching and investment process, we begin with equilib-
rium for the matching process. We can then proceed to the investment stage
assuming that families foresee the impact that their investment will have on
the outcome of the matching process.
7 The Matching Process
Without loss of generality, we can assume that there are n families in F
and m families in M with n > m. The families in M have income levels
fy1;:::;ymg listed in descending order, so that family 1 is richest and family
m is poorest. Similarly for F the endowments are fy1;:::;yng in descending









for i = 1;:::m as the bilateral Nash investment level for each family in M,






j=1;nbe the bilateral Nash investment
levels for the various families in F. To simplify the argument, it will be
assumed that y1 > y2 > y3::: for income levels in both M and F (which
implies that the same property will hold for the Nash investment levels).
Fix an array w = fw1;:::wmg of wealth levels for children in M and
an array w0 = fw0
1;:::w0
ng of wealth levels for children in F. Alternatively,
we will refer to the empirical distribution functions  and 0 generated by
these investments. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that these
wealth levels are listed in descending order, so that wj  wj+1 for all j, and
w0
k  w0
k+1 for all k.
Males advertize their wealth levels, females make proposals, then males
accept one of the ones they most prefer. This is a simple nite game played
between the children, and as such it always has a Nash equilibrium. Some
equilibria are problematic. For example, suppose there are two children on
each side of the market and that all four children have the same wealth
level. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each female proposes
to each male with equal probability, and each male accepts each female who
proposes to him with equal probability. In this equilibrium, it can occur
11with positive probability that a male and female remain unmatched. This
outcome does not seem reasonable. However, it is straightforward to show
that the proposal game described above always has a pure strategy assortative
matching equilibrium in which the child in M with investment wi matches
with probability 1 with the child from F who has investment w0
i. Call the
children in the ith position on each side of the market designated partners.
Then a shorthand would be to say that there is a pure strategy equilibrium
in which i matches with probability 1 with his or her designated partner.
Assortative matching is the property of this equilibrium and this match-
ing process that will be used below. Since the arguments are the same on
both sides, focus on families in M. Let 0 denote the empirical distribution of
investment levels for families in F and let  be the distribution of investments
for all the families in M. Let ~ gi (wi;;0) be the investment level of i's des-
ignated partner in F given the distribution 0 and given that i's investment
level in  has been replaced with wi. We will also use the notation ^ (w) to de-
note the empirical distribution generated by the array of investments w. The
function ~ gi represents family i's return to investment. The assortative prop-
erty of the matching process ensures that ~ g is non-decreasing. The matching
process will not generally be anonymous since in the event of ties, equal in-
vestments by families in M might yield dierent investments on the part of
the children with whom their children match. However if w = (w1;:::wm)
has no two components in common (which is generic at least with respect
to Lebesgue measure) then the matching process is anonymous in the sense
that ~ gi (wi;;0) = ~ gj (wi;;0).
In the sequel, we will be interested in situation in which the distribution
0 is itself random with some known distribution . Let  be the distribu-
tion of the mean values of the order statistics associated with the random










8 Investment and Equilibrium
The families choose investment levels in the rst stage of the game, tak-
ing full account of the eect that their investment has on the continuation
equilibrium in which their children match. Given distributions  and 0 of
investments for families in M and F respectively, the payo to family i is
12given by
vi (w;w
0) = V (yi   wi) +
wi + ~ gi (wi;;0)
z
This payo function is discontinuous because if family i and family i   1
both have the same investment level, then family i can increase the wealth
of their child's partner from w0
i to w0
i 1 by raising investment slightly. Thus
we cannot generally hope to nd pure strategy equilibria for the investment
game. However, the payo functions have the properties required by the
Reny (Reny 1999) existence theorem for equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Theorem 2 The investment game has at least one equilibrium in mixed
strategies.
9 Minimal Competition Induces Additional
Investments
The usefulness of the existence result in the previous section is limited by
the fact that equilibrium strategies are quite complex. It is very dicult to
give a useful characterization of equilibrium in the general case. To begin, we
consider a very simple case where a complete characterization is possible. We
follow by pointing out the properties of the equilibrium that do generalize.
We begin with the case where there are four families. One of the families
from F and one from M have and initial endowment yl while the other pair of







where, in an obvious notation the superscript f refers to children of families
from F while the superscript m refers to children of families in M. In the case





continuation equilibrium is straightforward. The wealthy child from F will
propose to the wealthy child from M with probability 1 and this proposal
will be accepted. Similarly for the less wealthy children. The poor F has no
incentive to propose to the wealthy M because she expects the wealthy F to
propose there with probability 1 and she knows that the wealthy male will
always prefer her proposal.
If the wealth disparity of the families is large enough, it will never pay
families to try to improve their children's match quality. In that case there
will be an obvious equilibrium where families make non-cooperative invest-


























The assumption says that a poor family would be willing to raise invest-
ment to w
h if they believed that this would generate a match with a child
from a wealthy family making the non-cooperative investment.
Then we have:
Theorem 3 There exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the wealthy families both use mixture Hh while the poor families both use
mixture Hl. These mixtures have the following properties:
1. Hl has an atom at w
l and Hh has an atom at w




2. Hl and Hh both have smooth density functions on some interval [w
h;w]
with H0
l (s) < H0
h (s) for all s 2 [w
h;w]
The proof of this theorem is constructive. The argument resembles the
argument for a Bertrand competition with capacity constraints. If one family
invests more than the other, that family's child will match with the wealthi-
est child on the other side of the market. In the mixed strategy equilibrium
investments generate random returns since the investment level of the com-
peting family is random. The major complication involved in this argument
arises from the fact that family who invests most gets a random return equal
to the rst order statistic for investment levels on the other side of the mar-
ket. The distribution of this order statistic is endogenous. This constitutes
the main technical diculty to be overcome in the proof.
The theorem illustrates nicely the inherent unpredictability of investment.
Both kinds of families choose their bilateral Nash investment level with pos-
itive probability. However, they also use a strategy that involves investment
at a level strictly above w
h with positive probability. It follows immediately
that both families will invest, on average, strictly more than their bilateral
Nash investment levels. From the position of the atoms, and the restriction
on densities, it is immediate that the family with the highest endowment
will invest more, on average, than the family with the low endowment. With
randomization however, there is a strictly positive probability that the poor
14family will end up investing more than the wealthy family. Their child will
then be at the top of the wealth distribution. We interpret this as endogenous
intergenerational mobility in wealth.
10 Discussion
There is also a close connection between the models in this paper and the
directed search models of the labor market (for example (Shi 1999) or (Moen
1997)). To see this suppose that there is a measurable set of rms who
invest in physical capital and workers who invest in human capital. Firms
have dierent technologies parameterized by some variable y 2 R with the
marginal product of capital increasing in y. Workers dier according to a
parameter y0 that determined the cost at which the worker can acquire human
capital. This cost is assumed to be decreasing as y0 increases. Each rm has a
single job to be lled and each worker wishes to ll one job. The total output
produced by the rm is some increasing function of the physical capital w
invested by the rm and the human capital w0 invested by the worker who
lls the job. Physical capital is purchased by the rm at a xed price r
while human capital is acquired by the worker according to a convex and
increasing cost e(w0). For the moment, assume that when a rm and worker
match, each receives a xed share of the prot that is created. So if a rm
who invests physical capital w is matched with a worker with human capital
w0, the prot of the rm is
f (w;w
0;y)   rw
while the prot of the worker is




The functional form used in this example diers slightly from that used in the
marriage market above, but otherwise the problems are identical. If we allow
the rms to advertize their capital stocks after they make their investments
so that workers can apply to the rm that they like, all the equilibria will
involve assortative matching exactly as in the marriage problem.
The hedonic value of the rms investment w is given by some function
g (w) that gives the human capital that will be embodied in the worker that
the rm expects to be able to attract. Conversely, any worker who wants
15a job at a rm with physical capital w will have to provide the level g (w)
of human capital to get the job. In equilibrium, this hedonic value will en-
sure that rms and workers will invest eciently. This is similar to the
result in (Moen 1997), though it generalizes that result by allowing rms
and workers to dier, and by endogenizing the investments on both sides of
the market. There are also some important dierences. In the existing
literature on directed search in labor markets, frictions generated by workers
inability to coordinate their search decisions play an important role.2 The
hedonic value of any given wage that a rm oers to pay workers is then
measured by the size of the queue of applicants that the rm attracts. The
model here shows that when families or workers dier in equilibrium, the
mixed strategy equilibria that support these frictions disappear - the match-
ing equilibria that occur after wages are posted or capital stocks are chosen
involve pure assortative matching - families use their own characteristics to
coordinate their search decisions. Despite this, the hedonic interpretation in
which the market responds to specic investments with a predictable return
is supported.
The other major dierence is that there are no side payments in the model
studied here (in the labor market interpretation, rms do not oer wages but
instead simply give workers an exogenously determined split of the prot).
The case where workers and rms have multidimensional characteristics is
certainly likely to support a hedonic interpretation, but so far models of this
form have not been studied.
One of the predictions of the model studied here is certainly too strong -
pure assortative matching. Clearly the model needs to be extended to allow
for unobservable or match specic characteristics. The payo to focussing
on the case with perfect information is the simplicity of the model that it
delivers. A synthesis of the directed search models of the kind discussed
here and the random matching models that characterize the older literature
is clearly an important topic for future research.
11 Appendix
11.1 Pure strategy equilibria in the matching game
2Frictions are generated by the fact that workers use mixed strategies when they choose
which rms to apply to (Shi 1999), or (Peters 1999).
16played among the children 4:
Males choose a selection rule that species for each subset of the set of
females, the probability with which he will accept each dierent proposal
from that set. Let P be the set of all subsets of females. A selection rule for
male i is a mapping i : P !RM satisfying i
j (S)  0 for all j = 1;:::M;
PM
j=1 i
j (S)  1; and i
j0 = 0 whenever j0 = 2 S. Each female can make a
proposal to one and only one male. Let i
j be the probability that female j
proposes to male i.Write Qi
j (;) as the probability with which a proposal
by female j to male i is accepted when males and females are using the
strategies  and . Let (;) be a Nash (continuation) equilibrium for
the matching game. Equilibrium for this game exists by the niteness of the
underlying pure action space.
Equilibrium for this process involves assortative matching - a child who
has wealth w0 > w will have a wealthier partner than a child whose wealth is
w. The rationale is as follows. Consider a candidate non-assortative matching
equilibrium in which female j is matched with male i and female j0 < j is
matched with male i0 > i or unmatched. Since female j0 has wealth larger
than female j, she can make a marriage oer to male i and her oer will be
accepted. Moreover she will have the incentive to do so. Thus the candidate
non-assortative matching equilibrium cannot be an equilibrium (Lam 1988).
More formally, think of male i as the designated partner for female i and
conversely. Then we have the following lemma
Lemma 4 There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the choice pro-
cess in which each child matches with his or her designated partner with
probability 1. In particular, M
j = 1 for j > M; 
j
j = 1 for j = 1;:::;M;





> > > <
> > > :
1 if j 2 S; j = i; w0
j0  w0




1 if j 2 S; w0
j > w0









Remark 5 Observe that each male i selects his `designated partner' female
i if she is available among the set S who propose, and if her wealth is at least
as large as the wealth of all the others who propose. In particular, if there
is some female other than i who proposes to male i but who has the same
17wealth as male i's designated partner, male i will always select his designated
partner. So this equilibrium is not anonymous - the probability with which a
male accepts a female proposal depends both on her wealth and her identity.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward. The male's strategy is clearly
optimal, he simply chooses from all the females who propose to him, the one
with the highest wealth level. If there are multiple proposals in this cate-
gory, he chooses his designated partner when she is available, or the highest
index in the group if she is not. Females with very low wealth levels (indices
M +1 through N) all propose to male M. Their proposals are all rejected on
the equilibrium path, either because male M does not nd it worthwhile to
match, or because male M accepts the proposal from his designated partner
female M. Female j proposes with probability 1 to her designated partner
male j. Females with higher wealth (lower indices) propose to male j with
probability 0, so that female j can expect her proposal to be accepted with
probability 1. Thus she can never gain by deviating and proposing to a male
whose wealth level is no higher than the wealth level of her designated part-
ner. On the other hand, if she deviates by proposing to a male whose wealth
is strictly higher than the wealth of her designated partner, her proposal
will be rejected with probability1 since the seller to whom she proposes will
either have a proposal from a female with more wealth, or will choose his
designated partner. Since males and females share the same ex post payo
and the same payo when they do not match, they will agree on whether or
not to form a match ex post.
11.2 Proof of Theorem 2:
To verify the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, we take the approach
of Reny (Reny 1999) and show that the mixed extension of the rst stage
game conditional on the continuation equilibrium described in Lemma 4 is
reciprocally upper semi-continuous and payo secure. Observe rst that the
match value ~ g is weakly increasing in investment. This means that family
i will never invest less than it's bilateral Nash investment level w
i. By
Assumption 2, no family will invest more than it's endowment yi. So without
loss of generality, we can restrict each families strategy space to the convex
interval [w
i;yi]. Furthermore, since the matching function is determined
by the equilibrium of the second stage, the return to investment is bounded
above by the endowment of the richest family on the other side of the market.
18The rst stage game is the normal form game in which families have strategy
spaces [w
i;yi] and payos
V (yi   wi) +
wi + ~ gi





This rst stage 'game' is a compact game with metric strategy spaces.
Let 4i be the compact set of regular countably additive probability mea-
sures on (the Borel sets of) [w
i;yi]. The mixed extension of the rst stage
game is the game in which the families' strategy spaces are given by 4i and




V (yi   wi) +
wi + ~ gi





The sum of payos in the rst stage game is given by
m X
i=1













wi + ~ gi











































By assumption 2, this is continuous in (w;w0), and therefore upper semi-
continuous. Therefore by (Reny 1999, Proposition 5), the mixed extension
of the rst stage game is reciprocally upper-semicontinuous.
19The mixed extension of the rst stage game is payo secure if for every







 ui ()   "
for all 0
 i in some neighborhood of  i. To show that this property holds,
rewrite the payo function using linearity as









This function is linear, and therefore continuous in the strategies f i;0g.
Using assortative matching, the payo function family i faces can be further
specialized to









where w0 is the vector of expected values of the order statistics generated
by draws from the distributions 0 = f0
1;:::0
ng used by the families in F.
Finally, this can be written as






where qk (wi) is the probability with which the designated partner of family
i 2 M is family k 2 F. Let w00 > wi. Then by assortative matching, in any
state in which an investment of wi earns return wk, raising investment to w00
will either leave i's designated partner unchanged, or raise it. Thus














Then the continuity of V , for any "=2 > 0, there is a w00 such that














By the continuity of the payo in the strategies f i;0g of the other fami-
lies, this inequality holds on some open neighborhood of  i. To get payo
security in the mixed extension, choose wi such that






20is within "=2 of the supremum of this payo. This implies that family i can
secure a payo within " of the supremum of this payo function.
By (Reny 1999, Corollary 5.2), reciprocal upper semi-continuity and pay-
o security of the mixed extension together imply that the rst stage game
has a mixed strategy equilibrium.
11.3 Proof of Theorem 3:
Restrict attention for the moment to families in M. The proof is constructive.
Let w and w be the ex post expected level of investment of the poorest and
wealthiest child in F. Let Hw and Hl denote the probability mixtures used by
the wealthy and rich families in M respectively and suppose that these satisfy
the hypothesis of the theorem. In other words, Hl and Hh have atoms at w
l
and w
h respectively, and are otherwise smooth on some interval [w
h;w].
Consider the wealthy family rst. If it turns out that it's child has the
highest investment level ex post, then he will match with the wealthiest child
in F who will have expected investment w. If he is poorest ex post, he will
match with the poorest child in F, gaining a partner whose expected wealth
is w. The only tie we need to worry about occurs when the poor family
invests exactly w
h and this is matched by the rich family. In this case we
assume that the wealthy child from F proposes to the male from the poor
family for sure.3 Under these conditions, the expected payo when the family








+ (1   Hl (w))






To support the equilibrium this must be constant along [w
h;w] and equal
to




h + (1   Hl (w
h))w + Hl (w
h)w
z
to induce the wealthy family in M to make the investment. If the function
is constant, it's derivative should be almost everywhere 0, or
 V









3This is for notational convenience only - our results are unaected by the tie breaking
rule. If the rich child from F randomizes in some fashion, the payo to playing w
h exactly
will still be smaller than the limit of the payos associated with playing slightly more than
w









The function Hl is then determined (up to a constant) by integrating














V (yh   w








h) is the probability with which the low wealth family invests w
l .
This atom, and the value of w are determined below.
The poor family faces a similar problem. Let Hh be the distribution of
investments by the wealthy family. The poor family's payo is
Hh (w)





+ (1   Hh (w))





and this should be constant on the interval [w

























h) is the probability with which the wealthy family invests w
h.
The poor family will choose the investment level w
l on the equilibrium
path, so the atom in Hh (w
h) should be chosen to make the poor family
indierent between the investment levels w
l and w
h conditional on the as-
sumption that if the poor family invests w
h it will match with the rich family
on the other side of the market in the event of ties. To accomplish this,















































Then reasoning as above, we have that
Hh (w) = Hh (w

h) +
V (yl   w







V (yl   w







Finally, there can be no atoms at the top of the distribution of investments
because of the discontinuous increase in expected wealth that this creates.
So the atom at Hl (w
h) (i.e., the probability that the poor family chooses
investment w
l ) should be chosen so that the top of the supports of Hl and
Hh coincide. The top of the support of Hh is given by the solution to
V (yl   w










h) = 1  
V (yh   w







Note that since the density of the distribution Hh is uniformly higher on
the interval [w
h;w] than the density of Hl, it follows that the atom H
l (w
h)
is strictly larger than the atom Hh (w
l ) which veries the two properties of
the distributions mentioned in the theorem. One implication of this is that
the mean investment of the wealthy family exceeds the mean investment of
the poor family.
Conditional on the mean payo levels, w and w it is straightforward to
show that neither family can protably deviate from this strategy. The poor
family is indierent between investing w
l and any investment level in the
support [w
h;w] by construction. Investment levels between w
l and w
h
guarantee a match with a partner whose expected wealth is w. Since this
23outcome is the same for every investment level on the interval [w
l ;w
h) the
poor family's expected utility is strictly higher when they invest w
l than
it is when they invest any amount in (w
l ;w
h) by the strict concavity of
V . Similarly, the quality of the poor family's match is independent of it's
investment level if it tries to invest more than w, so investments above w
are strictly dominated. The arguments supporting the rich families strategy
are identical.
These distributions generate mean wealth levels for the wealthy and rich
children in M as given by
w





























































l (t)tdt + Hl (s)s

ds (13)
The problem faced by families in F is completely symmetric. So to verify
the existence of equilibrium it remains to show that if families in F also use
these distributions, then the mean wealth levels w0 and w0 that they generate
are equal to the wealth levels w and w used to construct the strategies. In
other words, this will constitute and equilibrium if there are values for w and
w that constitute a xed point in equations (12) and (13).
To prove that such values exist, we simplify the approach slightly by
dening a single dimensional transformation. Let
4 2
"












represent the expected gain
w w
z associated with matching with the wealthy
child. For each value 4, equations 6,9, 10, and 11 completely determine
24the 'equilibrium'4 mixed strategies for each of the families in M as described


















Furthermore, this upper bound varies continuously. Since











by the strict concavity of V , it is apparent by inspection that the right hand
sides of equations (12) and (13) both vary continuously with
w w





































Observe that Assumption 9 says that





























4Bear in mind that these may not be full equilibrium strategies, since the strategies
being used by the families in F may not support the expected gain 4.








On the other hand, as
w w
z gets large, the support of the mixed strategies of
both families are constrained by Assumption 2 to lie in a bounded interval
[w




















has a xed point which denes the full equilibrium strategies.
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